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Abstract. We study auction mechanisms for sharing spectrum among a group of users, subject to a constraint on the interference
temperature at a measurement point. The users access the channel using spread spectrum signaling and so interfere with each other. Each
user receives a utility that is a function of the received signal-to-interference plus noise ratio. We propose two auction mechanisms for
allocating the received power. The ﬁrst is an auction in which users are charged for received SINR, which, when combined with logarithmic
utilities,leadstoaweightedmax-minfairSINRallocation.Thesecondisanauctioninwhichusersarechargedforpower,whichmaximizes
the total utility when the bandwidth is large enough and the receivers are co-located. Both auction mechanisms are shown to be socially
optimal for a limiting “large system” with co-located receivers, where bandwidth, power and the number of users are increased in ﬁxed
proportion. We also formulate an iterative and distributed bid updating algorithm, and specify conditions under which this algorithm
converges globally to the Nash equilibrium of the auction.
Keywords: CDMA, spectrum sharing, power control, game theory, auction
1. Introduction
There has been growing interest in making more efﬁcient use
of spectrum by shifting from the conventional “command-
and-control” spectrum usage model to more ﬂexible
“Exclusive Use” and “Commons” models (e.g. see [1]). In
the Exclusive Use model, the licensee has exclusive rights
to the spectrum, but could allow other users to purchase ac-
cess rights to the spectrum when it is underutilized. In the
Commons model, spectrum is unlicensed and an unlimited
number of users can share spectrum with usage rights gov-
erned by technical standards. In either model, a basic ques-
tion is how to share the available spectrum efﬁciently and
fairly. A proposed requirement (e.g. see [1])i st h a tt h ein-
terference temperature in the spectrum band be kept under
some threshold, where interference temperature is deﬁned to
be the RF power measured at a receiving antenna per unit
bandwidth.
In this paper, we study a spectrum allocation problem un-
der such an interference temperature constraint. This model
is motivated by the scenario in which users wish to purchase
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a local, relatively short-term data service. The spectrum
to be used may be licensed to an independent entity (e.g.,
private company) or controlled by a government agency,
either of which we refer to as a manager. Users may transmit
to receivers at different locations, or to co-located receivers
at a single access point. In both cases, the manager controls
the amount of bandwidth and power assigned to each user
in order to keep the interference temperature at a given mea-
surement point below a certain threshold. We assume that all
users adopt a spread spectrum signaling format, in which the
transmitted power is evenly spread across the entire available
band controlled by the manager. This allows efﬁcient multi-
plexing of data streams from different sources corresponding
to different applications, and reduces the combined power-
bandwidth allocation problem to a received power allocation
problem. Each user has a utility, which is a function of the
received Signal-to-Interference plus Noise Ratio (SINR),
reﬂecting his desired Quality of Service (QoS). The interfer-
ence a user receives depends on the other users’ transmission
powersandthecross-channelgains,aswellasthebandwidth.
In this setting, an interference temperature constraint is
equivalent to a constraint on the received power at the mea-
surement point. This allows us to view the received power as
a divisible good; we study auction mechanisms for allocat-
ing this good. It is well known that a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves
(VCG) auction can be used to achieve a socially optimal
allocation, i.e., maximize the total utility [2]. However, as
discussed in Section 2.2, this may not be suitable here due
to the required information from the users and the computa-406 HUANG, BERRY AND HONIG
tional burden on the manager. Instead, we propose two auc-
tions mechanisms that allocate the received power as a func-
tion of bids submitted by the users and the price announced
by the manager. We model the resulting problem as a non-
cooperative game [2], and characterize the Nash equilibria
and related properties of the two auctions. We ﬁrst analyze
these auctions as a simultaneous move game, assuming all
information (i.e., utilities and link channel gains) is avail-
able to the users (but not to the manager). We subsequently
formulate an iterative and fully distributed algorithm, which
only requires the users to obtain limited local information
in order to converge globally to the Nash equilibrium (NE).
This makes the auction mechanisms easily implementable
and scalable with the user population size.
Our approach is similar to a share auction (see [3–8] and
thereferencestherein),ordivisibleauction,whereaperfectly
divisiblegoodissplitamongbidderswhosepaymentsdepend
solely on the bids. A common form of bids in a share auction
is for each user to submit his demand curve (e.g., [3–5]), i.e.,
the amount of goods a user desires as a function of the price.
The auctioneer can then compute a market clearing price
based on the set of demand curves. However, in our problem,
a user’s demand curve for received power also depends on
the demands of other users due to interference. On the other
hand, if the demand curves are viewed in terms of SINR so
that they are mutually independent, the market clearing price
for SINR is not easy to ﬁnd since the constraint is on received
power. To overcome these difﬁculties, we adopt a signaling
system similar to [6–8], where users submit one dimensional
bids for the resource.
We assume a weighted proportional allocation rule in
which a user’s power allocation is proportional to his bid.
This type of allocation rule has been studied in a wide range
of applications (e.g., see [9,10]) including network resource
allocation (e.g., [6–8]). Given this allocation, the users par-
ticipate in a game with the objective of maximizing their
own beneﬁt. It is well known that the NE typically does not
maximize the total system utility [11]. This has been referred
to as the price of anarchy (e.g., [6]). In order to achieve a
more desirable NE, we allow the manager to announce a unit
price (e.g., [12,13]) either for received SINR (a SINR auc-
tion) or received power (a power auction). An SINR auction
with logarithmic utilities leads to a weighted max-min fair
SINR allocation. A power auction maximizes the total utility
for a large enough bandwidth with co-located receivers. Both
auctions maximize the total utility in a large enough system
withco-locatedreceiversifthetotalpowerandbandwidthare
increased in ﬁxed proportion to the number of users. Related
work on uplink power control for CDMA has appeared in
[13–16]. A key difference here is that there is a constraint on
thetotalreceivedpoweratalltimes.1 Becauseofthis,auser’s
interference depends on his own power allocation, which can
make the problem non-convex.
1We assume that any transmission power constraint for each user is large
enough so that it can be ignored.
We assume the user population is stationary, i.e., the users
and their corresponding utilities stay ﬁxed during the time
period of interest. On a larger time-scale one can view time
divided into periods, during which the number of users and
each user’s utility are ﬁxed and the proposed auction algo-
rithm is used. When a new period begins, users may join or
leave the system. Remaining users may update their utilities
to reﬂect changes in their QoS requirements. For example,
a user with data that must be delivered by a deadline might
increase his utility (as a function of SINR) as the deadline
approaches. Here we do not consider mechanisms and asso-
ciated dynamics over multiple periods.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. After
introducing the auction mechanisms in Section 2, we analyze
the performance for a ﬁnite system and for a limiting “large
system”inSections3and4,respectively.InSection5wegive
an iterative and distributed bid updating algorithm, and show
that it converges globally to the unique NE of the auction
when one exists. Numerical results are given in Section 6 and
conclusionsinSection7.Severalofthemainproofsaregiven
in the Appendix.
2. Auction mechanisms
2.1. System model
Spectrum with bandwidth B is to be shared among M spread
spectrum users, where a user refers to a transmitter and an in-
tendedreceiverpair.Useri’svaluationofthespectrumischar-
acterized by a utility Ui (γi), where γi is the received SINR
at user i’s receiver. We primarily consider the case where
each user’s utility is given by Ui (γi) = U (θi,γ i), where θi
is a user-dependent parameter. As a particular example, we
consider the logarithmic utility Ui (γi) = θi ln(γi).2
Assumption 1. For each user i,Ui (γi) is increasing, stric-
tly concave, and twice continuously differentiable in γi.
Utilities that satisfy this assumption are commonly used
to model “elastic” data applications [17]. For each i,t h e
received SINR is given by
γi =
pihii
n0 + 1
B
  
j =i pjhji
 , (1)
where pi is user i’s transmission power, hij is the channel
gain from user i’s transmitter to user j’s receiver, and n0 is the
backgroundnoisepowerthatisassumedtobethesameforall
users. To satisfy an interference temperature constraint, the
total received power at a speciﬁed measurement point must
satisfy
M  
i=1
pihi0 ≤ P, (2)
2This approximates the weighted rate of user i in the high SINR regime.AUCTION-BASED SPECTRUM SHARING 407
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Figure 1. System model for M transmitter-receiver pairs.
where hi0 is the channel gain from user i’s transmitter to the
measurement point. The system model is shown in Figure 1.
A power allocation is Pareto optimal if no user’s utility can
be increased without decreasing another user’s utility.
Lemma 1. A power allocation scheme is Pareto optimal if
and only if the total received power constraint is tight, i.e.,  M
i=1 pihi0 = P.
This follows because if the power constraint is not tight,
then each user can increase their power by a factor of
P/
 M
i=1 pihi0, which increases the SINR for every user.
Lemma1doesnotrequireAssumption1;inparticular,Ui (γi)
does not have to be concave in γi, although it must be strictly
increasing. Note that Pareto optimality does not indicate how
to split resources among users, only that the resource should
be fully utilized. A stronger condition is social optimality,
where the total utility
 M
i=1 Ui (γi) is maximized. Social
optimality implies Pareto optimality, but the reverse is not
true. Therefore, to achieve social optimality, the manager
should always ensure that the received power constraint is
tight.
A special case, on which we will focus, is when the re-
ceiversareco-locatedwiththemeasurementpoint.Thiscould
model a situation where a service provider purchases the
spectrum usage rights from the manager and provides ser-
vice from a single access point. In this case, hij = hi0 for all
i,j ∈ {1,...,M}, and we denote user i’s received power as
pr
i = pihi0. In a Pareto optimal allocation for this co-located
receiver case, we have for each user i,
γi ≡ γi
 
pr
i
 
=
pr
i
n0 + 1
B
 
P − pr
i
 ,
so that user i’s utility Ui(γi(pr
i)) under a Pareto optimal allo-
cation does not depend on how the power is allocated among
the interferers.
We assume that each user’s utility is private information,
i.e., only known to the user himself. The manager must then
design a mechanism for allocating power without having this
knowledge ap r i o r i . Also the manager may not have ap r i o r i
knowledge of the channel gains, hij’s. One such mechanism
is the VCG auction.
2.2. VCG auction for spectrum sharing
A VCG auction results in a socially optimal outcome,
and it is a (weakly) dominant strategy for users to bid
truthfully (i.e., state their true utilities). In our context,
a VCG auction can be described as follows: First, users
are asked to submit their utilities {Ui (γi)}. The manager
then computes the power allocation p∗ = (p∗
1,...,p∗
M) that
maximizes the total utility, i.e., Umax =
 M
j=1 Uj(γj(p∗)),
given the received power constraint, and allocates power
to the users accordingly. Furthermore, the manager com-
putes the maximum total utility if user i is excluded from
the auction, i.e., Umax/i = max{pj}/pi
 
j =i Uj(γj) for each
i ∈ M. In total, the manager must solve M + 1 optimiza-
tion problems. The manager then charges user m the amount
Umax/i −
 
j =i Uj(γj(p∗)), which is the decrement in sum
utility over all other users from including user i in the
auction.
The VCG auction may not be suitable in this con-
text for several reasons: (i) In order to completely spec-
ify the users’ utilities, in particular, the SINR in (1),f o r
each user i, the channel gains hij for all i,j ∈ {1,...,M}
must be measured by the users and reported to the man-
ager. This might be a heavy burden for the users in a
large network. (ii) The manager must solve M + 1 opti-
mization problems, which are typically non-convex due to
the interference. This becomes computationally expensive
for large M, and may not be suitable for online alloca-
tions. For these reasons, we examine mechanisms that re-
quire less information exchange and less computation for the
manager.
2.3. One-dimensional auctions with pricing
We now describe two auctions (SINR-and power-based) in
which users submit one-dimensional bids representing their
willingness to pay, and the manager simply allocates the re-
ceived power in proportion to the bids. The users then pay an
amount proportional to their SINR (or power). The manager
announces a nonnegative reserve bid β, and uses a corre-
sponding reserve power that interferes with the other users.
In contrast with the situation where the manager submits a
reserve bid to extract more revenue from the other bidders
[18], here the main purpose of the reserve bid is to guarantee
a unique desirable outcome of the auction. We will show that
the interference generated by the manager can be made arbi-
trarilysmall. Although the twoauctions arerelatively simple,
we show that under some mild conditions they give power
allocations that are arbitrarily close to the allocation from a
VCG auction.
Regarding the information structure of the auction, we
ﬁrst assume that it is a complete information game, i.e., all
users’ utilities and all channel gains are known to all users. In408 HUANG, BERRY AND HONIG
Section 5, we present a distributed algorithm that can achieve
the NE of the auction with limited information, where each
user i only needs to measure the background noise density
n0, the channel gain ratio ˆ hii = hii/hi0 and the SINR at his
own receiver.
Simultaneous Auction Algorithm:
(1) The manager announces a reserve bid β ≥ 0, and a price
πs > 0 (in an SINR auction) or πp > 0 (in a power auc-
tion).
(2) After observing β,πs (or πp), user i ∈ {1,...,M} sub-
mits a bid bi ≥ 0.
(3) The manager keeps reserve power p0, and allocates to
each user i a transmission power pi so that the received
power at the measurement point is proportional to the
bids, i.e.,
pihi0 =
bi
 M
j=1 bi + β
P, and p0 =
β
 M
j=1 bi + β
P.
(3)
The resulting SINR for user i is
γi =
pihii
n0 + 1
B
  
j =i pjhji + p0h0i
 , (4)
where h0i is the channel gain from the manager (mea-
surement point) to user i’s receiver.3 If
 M
i=1 bi +β = 0,
then pi = 0.
(4) In an SINR (power) auction, user i pays Ci = πsγi
(Ci = πppihi0)
A bidding proﬁle is the vector containing the users’ bids
b = (b1,...,b M).T h ebidding proﬁle of user i’s opponents
is deﬁned as b−i = (b1,...,b i−1,b i+1,...,b M), so that b =
(bi;b−i). In the preceding auctions, each user i submits a bid
bi to maximize his surplus function
Si (bi;b−i) = Ui (γi (bi;b−i)) − Ci.
Here we omit the dependence on β and π.
An NE of the auction is associated with a bidding proﬁle
b∗ such that Si(b∗
i ;b∗
−i) ≥ Si(b 
i;b∗
−i) for any b 
i ∈ [0,∞) and
any user i. Deﬁne user i’s best response given b−i as the set
Bi (b−i) =
 
ˆ bi | ˆ bi = arg max
bi∈[0,∞)
Si (bi;b−i)
 
,
i.e., the set of bi’s that maximize Si(bi;b−i)g i v e naﬁ x e d
b−i.4 The NE bidding proﬁle b
∗ is a ﬁxed point, i.e., no user
has the incentive to deviate unilaterally. The existence and
uniqueness of an NE are shown in the following to depend
on β and πs (or πp).
3If h0i = 0 for all i ∈ {1,...,M}, then the manager does not interfere with
theusersandmanyoftheresultsinthefollowingsectionstillhold.However,
in the co-located case, we have h0i = 1 for all i.
4In general the best response set may contain more than one element.
These auction mechanisms differ from some previously
proposedauction-basednetworkresourceallocationschemes
(e.g., [6,7]) in that the bids here are not the same as the
payments. Instead, the bids are signals of willingness to pay.
The manager can therefore inﬂuence the NE by choosing β
and πs (or πp). This alleviates the typical inefﬁciency of the
NE,andallowsustoreachParetooptimal,andinsomecases,
socially optimal solutions.
3. Finite system analysis
3.1. SINR auction
In this case, Ci = πsγi = πs pihii
n0+ 1
B (
 M
j =i pjhji+p0h0i), so that
each user’s payment depends on both the transmission power
and the interference.
Theorem 1. In an SINR auction:
(1) For β>0, there exists a threshold price πs
th > 0 such
that a unique NE exists if πs >π s
th, and there is no NE if
πs ≤ πs
th.
(2) For β = 0, one of the following is true: (i) there is a
unique NE with b∗
i = 0 for all i, (ii) there are an inﬁnite
number of Nash Equilibria, or (iii) there is no NE.
The proof is given in Appendix A; as shown there, when
β>0andπs >π s
th,thebestresponseforeachuserisunique,
and the vector of best responses across users is given by
B(b) = Kb + k0β, (5)
where K = [kij(πs)]i,j∈{1,...M} is a nonnegative matrix with
kii (πs) = 0 for all i and
kij(πs) =
gi(πs)(n0B + P ˆ hji)
PBˆ hii − gi(πs)noB
≥ 0, ∀j  = i, (6)
vector k0 = (k10,...,k M0) has nonnegative elements
ki0(πs) =
gi (πs)(n0B + Ph 0i)
PBˆ hii − gi (πs)noB
≥ 0, (7)
and gi (πs) is a nonnegative and continuously nonincreasing
function deﬁned as
gi
 
πs 
=

 
 
∞, 0 ≤ πs ≤ U 
i (∞),
U
 −1
i (πs),U  
i (∞) <π s <U  
i (0),
0,U  
i (0) ≤ πs.
(8)
The spectral radius of matrix K,ρ K, satisﬁes 0 ≤ ρK < 1.
The unique NE is
b
∗ = (I − K)−1 k0β =
∞  
n=0
Knk0β.
where I is the identity matrix.
Since we would like to avoid case (2) in Theorem 1, we
assume β>0 in the rest of the paper. Notice that the valueAUCTION-BASED SPECTRUM SHARING 409
of β does not affect the power allocation at the NE, since
all equilibrium bids are proportional to β. Thus the manager
only needs to announce an arbitrary β>0. In general, πs
th
in Theorem 1 is difﬁcult to ﬁnd analytically. However, in
the co-located receiver case with logarithmic utilities, we
have a closed-form relation between πs
thand the users’ utility
parameters. For i ∈ {1,...,M}, deﬁne
ki(πs) =
gi (πs)(P + Bn0)
PB− gi (πs)n0B
. (9)
Proposition 1. In an SINR auction with co-located re-
ceivers and logarithmic utilities, ki(πs
th) ≥ 0 for each user
i and
 M
i=1 ki(πs
th)/(1 + ki(πs
th)) = 1.
ThisfollowsfromtheproofofTheorem1byusingthefact
that with co-located receivers kil (πs) = ki (πs) for all l ∈
{0,...,M}, and explicitly solving for the NE. The bidding
and power proﬁles at the NE are:
b∗
i =
ki(πs)
1+ki(πs)
1 −
 M
j=1
kj(πs)
1+kj(πs)
β and
p∗
i =
ki (πs)
1 + ki (πs)
P for i ∈ {1,...,M}. (10)
Given the existence of a unique NE, we next charac-
terize the resulting resource allocation. We say an alloca-
tion {xi}i∈{1,...,M} is weighted max-min fair with weights
{wi}i∈{1,...,M} if for each i ∈ {1,...,M},x i can not be in-
creased without decreasing some xj,j ∈ {1,...,M},f o r
which xj/wj ≤ xi/wi.
Proposition 2. If a unique NE exists in an SINR auction
with logarithmic utilities, the SINR allocation {γ ∗
i }i∈{1,...,M}
areweightedmax-minfairwiththeweights{θi}i∈{1,...,M} given
a ﬁxed reserve power p∗
0, and the payments {C∗
i }i∈{1,...,M} are
proportional with the same weights.
Proof. User i’s unique best response satisﬁes
∂Ui (γi (Bi (b−i);b−i))
∂γi (Bi (b−i);b−i)
=
θi
γi (Bi (b−i);b−i)
= πs,
i.e., γ ∗
i /θi = 1/πs for all i. Clearly, no user’s SINR can be
increased without decreasing another user’s SINR. User i’s
payment satisﬁes C∗
i /θi =
 
πsγ ∗
i
 
/θi = 1. 
In [19], Kelly et al. consider an algorithm for rate al-
location in a wire-line network with logarithmic utilities
wi log(xi) for all users i ∈ {1,...,M}. In that case, the so-
ciallyoptimalrateallocation{xi}i∈{1,...,M} isweightedpropor-
tional fair with weights {wi}i∈{1,...,M}, i.e., for any other fea-
sible rate allocation {x 
i}i∈{1,...,M},
 M
i=1 wi
 
x 
i − xi
 
/xi ≤ 0.
Their utility maximization problem is convex and separable
since there is no externality (i.e., interference) among dif-
ferent users. Here, due to the interference among users, the
problem is generally not separable (except in the co-located
receiver case) and is typically not convex; thus the alloca-
tion achieved by the SINR auction with logarithmic utilities
typically is not socially optimal or proportional fair.5
In a system with a unique NE, deﬁne the system usage
efﬁciency by
η =
 M
i=1 p∗
i hi0
P
=
 M
i=1 b∗
i  M
i=1 b∗
i + β
.
For Pareto optimality η = 1, but the necessary condition for
the uniqueness of a unique NE is η<1 due to the required
positive reserve bid β, i.e., Pareto optimality and a unique
NE are conﬂicting objectives.6
We deﬁne an ε-system as one with parameters
(P ε,Bε,Mε,n ε
0) = (P(1 − ε),B,M,n 0 + εP/B), where
ε ∈ (0,1). An ε-Pareto optimal allocation is deﬁned as a
Pareto optimal solution for the ε-system.
Proposition 3. In an SINR auction, there exists a price πs
for any ε ∈ (0,1), such that the system has a unique NE and
achieves an ε-Pareto optimal solution (i.e., η = 1 − ε in the
original system).
Proof. From the proof of Theorem 1, it can be seen that
as πs increases from πs
th to ∞,ρ K(πs) decreases from 1
to 0, and is continuous and nonincreasing in the interval.
Also, the bidding proﬁle b
∗ = (
 ∞
n=0 Kn)k0β changes from
(for at least one user’s bid) to 0 (for all users’ bids), and
is also continuous and nonincreasing in the interval. This
implies the same for the summation
 M
i=1 b∗
i , which means
η =
 M
i=1 b∗
i /(
 M
i=1 b∗
i + β) decreases from 1 to 0, and is
continuous and nonincreasing in the interval. So there must
exist a price πs ∈ (πs
th,∞) that achieves any η = 1 − ε ∈
(0,1). 
In practice, the manager can achieve a target η∗ by adjust-
ing πs after observing the usage efﬁciency at the current NE:
if it is too low, the price should be decreased. Note that if the
price is decreased too much, there may not be an unique NE.
3.2. Power Auction
In this case Ci = πppihi0. For the co-located receiver case
with logarithmic utilities, Proposition 1 still holds, but with
a different expression for ki (πs) than that given in (9). The
bidding and power proﬁles at the NE are again given by
(10), but it may be impossible to ﬁnd a price πpε that gives
an arbitrary η = 1 − ε. This is because Ui(γi(pr
i)) is not
always concave in the received power pr
i, and so the pr
i that
maximizes user i’s surplus may not be continuous with price
πp, i.e., it may jump from one local optimum to the other.
5Moreover, in this setting the socially optimal allocation with logarithmic
utilities is not proportional fair.
6Here we are not including power used by the manager in our deﬁnition of
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As a result, η =
 M
i=1 pr
i/P may be discontinuous at some
values of πp.
We say that a power allocation is ε-socially optimal if it
maximizes the total utility of the ε-system. In the case of co-
locatedreceivers,thepowerauctioncanachieveanε-socially
optimal allocation for a more general class of utilities.
Assumption 2. For each i ∈ {1,...,M},U i (γi) satisﬁes
Assumption 1 and
   U  
i (γi)
   
U 
i (γi)
(γi + B) > 2 (11)
for any γi ∈ [0,P/n 0].
Inequality (11) follows from setting ∂2Ui(γi(pr
i))/∂2pr
i <
0foranypr
i ∈ [0,P/h i0],i.e.,theutilityisstrictlyconcavein
the received power. For the case of logarithmic utilities, As-
sumption2issatisﬁedifP/(Bn0) < 0dB.Formanyutilities
(e.g., θi log(1 + γi),1 − e−θiγi, and θiγ α
i (α ∈ (0,1))), As-
sumption 2 is satisﬁed when the bandwidth is large enough,
so that the interference among users is relatively small.
Theorem 2. In a power auction with co-located receivers
and Assumption 2, for any ε ∈ (0,1) there exists a price πpε
such that the system has a unique NE, and the NE achieves
ε-social optimality.
The proof is given in Appendix B. Theorem 2 implies that
with large enough bandwidth, so that the externality effects
among users are relatively small, the power auction with co-
located receivers can achieve an allocation that is arbitrarily
close to that produced by a VCG auction, and so is preferable
to the SINR auction in terms of social optimality. When As-
sumption 2 is not satisﬁed, the power auction may not be able
to achieve an η close to 1 (e.g., with logarithmic utilities);
this can result in a lower total utility compared to the SINR
auction, which can achieve any η.
3.3. Revenue comparison between SINR and power auctions
From the manager’s point of view, revenue maximization
might be another important objective. Here we restrict our
discussion to the two auctions previously described for co-
locatedreceivers.7 LetRp andRs betherevenuederivedfrom
the power and SINR auctions, respectively. We ﬁrst consider
thecasewhereusersareidentical(i.e.,havethesameutilities)
and the utilities are concave in power.
Theorem 3. Given co-located receivers, identical utilities,
andAssumption 2,supposefurtherthatbothauctionsachieve
the same system usage efﬁciency η. Then Rp >R s, and
Rp/Rs → 1 as M →∞ .
Proof. With identical utilities and same efﬁciency η, both
auctionsallocatethesamereceivedpower pr∗ toallusers.Let
7We note that other auction mechanisms may extract more revenue.
U(γ(pr)) = Ui(γi(pr
i)) for 1 ≤ i ≤ M. From the ﬁrst-order
conditions for surplus maximization,
πp = U (γ(pr))γ  (pr)|pr=pr∗ and
πs = U (γ(pr))|pr=pr∗ (12)
so that
Rp
Rs =
Mπppr∗
Mπsγ (pr∗)
=
U  (γ (pr))γ   (pr)|pr=pr∗pr∗
U  (γ (pr))|pr=pr∗γ (pr∗)
=
B(n0B+P)
(n0B+P−pr∗)2pr∗
pr∗B
n0B+P−pr∗
=
n0B + P
n0B + P − pr∗ > 1.
As M →∞ ,pr∗ → 0, and so Rp/Rs → 1. 
When Assumption 2 is not satisﬁed, the power auction
may collect less revenue than the SINR auction, since the
former might not be able to achieve η close to 1. However,
for logarithmic utilities the relation between the revenues
remains the same.
Proposition4. Givenco-locatedreceiverswithlogarithmic
utilities, assume there exists a ¯ θ such that θi ≤ ¯ θ for 1 ≤ i ≤
M. Then Rp >R s and Rp/Rs → 1 as M →∞ .
The proof is given in Appendix C. Notice that in Propo-
sition 4 we do not require identical utilities or the same η
in both auctions. Hence with logarithmic utilities the power
auction always generates more revenue.
4. Large system analysis
In this section we consider the asymptotic behavior as
P,B,M and β go to inﬁnity, while keeping P/M,B/M
and β/M ﬁxed. We focus on co-located receivers and assume
that each user i’s utility parameter θi is independently cho-
sen according to a continuous probability density f (θ) over  
θ, ¯ θ
 
, where 0 ≤ θ < ¯ θ<∞. The expected value of θ is
denoted as E [θ].
Proposition5. InanSINRauctionwithlogarithmicutilities
and co-located receivers, a unique NE exists in the large
system limit if and only if
πs >π s
th = E [θ](n0 + P/B)
M
P
. (13)
In this case, the power and SINR allocations at the NE are
weighted max-min fair with weights {θi}1≤i≤M, and user i
pays θi. If condition (13) is not satisﬁed, no NE exists.
The proof is given in Appendix D. The system usage ef-
ﬁciency at the NE is η =
E[θ](n0+P/B)
πsP/M .A sη → 1, the price
πs converges to πs
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M/P.Thiscoincideswiththecongestionpricingschemepro-
posed in [16], where the equilibrium price reﬂects the system
congestion.
In the limiting system with co-located receivers, all
users receive the same ﬁxed noise plus interference level
(n0 + P/B) at the NE, because each user gets a negligible
proportionofthetotalpower.ThismakestheSINRandpower
auctions equivalent if πs = (n0 + P/B)πp. The socially
optimal allocation maximizes the average utility per user.
(Note that the total utility is inﬁnite.)
Assumption 3. The utility U (θ,γ) is asymptotically sub-
linear with respect to γ, i.e.,
lim
γ→∞
1
γ
U (θ,γ) = 0, ∀θ.
Theorem 4. In the limiting system with co-located re-
ceivers, if U (θ,γ) satisﬁes Assumptions 1 and 3, then both
the SINR and power auctions can achieve ε-social optimality
for any ε ∈ (0,1).
AsketchoftheproofisgiveninAppendix E.8 Assumption
3isvalidforcommonutilities,e.g.,θ ln(γ),θln(1 + γ),and
θγα for any α ∈ (0,1), and any upper-bounded utility. Under
this assumption, even if a ﬁnite number of users are allocated
non-negligible proportions of the total power, their contribu-
tions to the average utility become negligible as the number
of users increases. Because of this, the socially optimal al-
location gives each user ﬁnite power, and so each user sees
the same interference level (n0 + P/B). In that case, both
auctions can achieve results that are arbitrarily close to that
of a VCG auction.
5. Iterative and distributed bid updating algorithm
In Section 2, we assumed that the users’ utility functions and
all the channel gains are public information, so that the auc-
tioncanbeanalyzedasasimultaneous-movegamewithcom-
plete information. In practice, the users’ utilities are likely to
be private information, and it is difﬁcult for user i to measure
the channel gains associated with other users, i.e., hjk for
j,k  = i. In that case, users cannot ﬁnd the NE of the auc-
tion in one iteration. Next, we present an iterative and fully
distributed algorithm that converges to the NE of the SINR
auctions.9
Suppose users update their bids according to the best re-
sponse (5) simultaneously in iterations t = 1,2,..., i.e.,
b
(t) = Kb
(t−1) + k0β, (14)
where b
(0) is an arbitrarily chosen feasible initial bidding
proﬁle.
8Theorem 4 can be generalized to the case of a non-collocated measurement
point. Here we consider only the co-located case to simplify the proof.
9Note that here we are still referring to the NE of the simultaneous move
game as in Section 2.3.
Proposition 6. If there exists a unique NE in the SINR
auction, then the update algorithm (14) globally converges
to the NE from any positive b
(0).
Proof. For a unique NE we must have K ≥ 0 (component-
wise), k0 ≥ 0 and ρK < 1. Under this conditions iterating
(14)g i v e s
lim
t→∞ b
(t) = lim
t→∞
 
Kt 
b
(0) + lim
t→∞
 
t−1  
n=0
Kn
 
(k0β)
= (I − K)−1 k0β,
which is the unique NE. 
Next, we show that (14) can be equivalently written in a
distributed fashion, where each user only needs to measure
the channel gain ˆ hii = hii/hi0, the background noise density
n0, and his received SINR γ
(t)
i in each iteration t.
Proposition 7. In the SINR auction, (14) is equivalent to
the following distributed updating algorithm for each user i
in iteration t = 1,2,...
b
(t)
i
=

 
 
gi (πs)P ˆ hii − gi (πs)γ
(t−1)
i n0
γ
(t−1)
i P ˆ hii − gi (πs)γ
(t−1)
i n0
b
(t−1)
i , if γ
(t−1)
i > 0,
0, if γ
(t−1)
i = 0,
(15)
with an arbitrary positive initial proﬁle b
(0).
Proof. From the proof of Theorem 1, we know that by
following the best response (14) in iteration t, each user i
submits a bid b
(t)
i in an attempt to achieve γi(b
(t)
i ;b
(t−1)
−i ) =
gi(πs), which maximizes his surplus during iteration t as-
suming the other bids are ﬁxed at b
(t−1)
−i .U s i n g( 3) and (4),
we have
b
(t)
i =
gi(πs)
 
n0
  
j =i b
(t−1)
j + β
 
+ (P/B)
  
j =i b
(t−1)
j ˆ hji + βh0i
  
P ˆ hii − gi(πs)n0
.
(16)
Again using (3) and (4) for the SINR at iteration t −1, we
have
n0


M  
j =i
b
(t−1)
j + β

 + (P/B)


M  
j =i
b
(t−1)
j ˆ hji + βh0i


= b
(t−1)
i (P ˆ hii − γ
(t−1)
i n0)/γ
(t−1)
i (17)
if γ
(t−1)
i > 0. By substituting this into (16) and noticing the
factthatγ
(t−1)
i = 0ifandonlyifb
(t−1)
i = 0,wegetthedesired
result. 412 HUANG, BERRY AND HONIG
The update (15) requires only that user i measure ˆ hii.
There is no need to know the other users’ bids. This makes
the algorithm distributed and scalable.
Theupdate(14)issimilartotheParallelUpdateAlgorithm
in [20] where users update their bids via a myopic strategy.
Unlike Figure 2 in [20], here the sequence of bids does not
oscillate if each user i chooses an initial bid b
(0)
i that is very
small (close to zero). This is due to the nonnegativity of the
matrix K. Intuitively, this is because the users’ best responses
have “strategic complementarity” [21]— roughly, this means
when one user submits a higher bid, the others want to do the
same. In that case, gradient-based or random updates do not
improve convergence.
The update [14] is mathematically similar to the power
control algorithm proposed in [22] (see also [23,24]) for a
cellular network, where users adjust their powers (without
any power constraints) to meet some preset target SINRs.
In those papers, the matrix K depends only on the channel
gainsandthetargetSINRs,andsomaynotsatisfyρK < 1(in
which case there would not be a feasible allocation). There
are several key differences between (14) and the algorithm
in [22]: (1) We consider elastic data trafﬁc without a preset
target SINR; (2) We have a total received power constraint;
(3) We use the algorithm to adjust bids instead of the power
itself; and (4) We can adjust the price so that a unique NE al-
ways exists. The mathematical similarity arises from the fact
that by designing appropriate auction mechanisms, we con-
vert the constrained power allocation problem into an uncon-
strained non-cooperative game, in which each user updates
his bid in an attempt to reach the desired equilibrium SINR
level.
Inpractice,wewouldliketoguaranteeauniqueNE,which
requires πs >π s
th, and to achieve high efﬁciency η, which
requires that πs be close to πs
th, without knowing the exact
value of πs
th. The manager must adaptively search for a suit-
able price. In our simulations, we use the following search
method:
(1) Initialization: Set (π,π) = (0,∞); choose an arbitrary
initial price π(0) > 0, and a maximum number of itera-
tions T. Set n = 0.
(2) Start the auction at price π(n),s e tn = n + 1.
(a) Iftheauction doesnotconverge withinTiterations,
then stop. Let π = π(n−1).I fπ =∞ , set π(n) =
2π(n−1); otherwise, set π(n) = (π + π)/2. Go to 2.
(b) If the auction converges within T iterations with
η<η ∗, then set π = π(n−1) and π(n) = (π +π)/2.
Go to 2.
(c) If the auction converges within T iterations with
η ≥ η∗, then stop.
Although we only discuss SINR auctions with logarith-
mic utilities, the bid updating algorithm also works for a
power auction with co-located receivers and logarithmic util-
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Figure 2. Utility comparisons in a ﬁnite system of users with logarithmic
utilities and co-located receivers: (Bn0,M) = (102,4).
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Figure 3. Utility comparisons in the large system limit of users with loga-
rithmic utilities and co-located receivers: (P/n0,B) = (104M,102M).
ities, as well as some other utilities such as Ui (γi) = θi log
(1 + γi). 10
6. Numerical results
We ﬁrst present some numerical results with logarith-
mic utilities and co-located receivers. In these simulations,
{θi}i∈{1,...,M} are independently and uniformly distributed in
[1,100]. Each graph represents an average over 100 indepen-
dent realizations.
Figures 2 and 3 show average utility per user for the two
auctions along with the socially optimal allocation. In both
auctions, we set the prices so that η is close to 1. From
Theorem 2, the power auction achieves social optimality for
P/(Bn0) < 0 dB. Figure 2 shows that the difference in utili-
ties achieved by the two auctions is negligible in this regime.
10Again, we note that in some cases a target η∗ may not be achievable in the
power auctions.AUCTION-BASED SPECTRUM SHARING 413
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For P/(Bn0) > 0 dB, the utility is not concave with power,
and the SINR auction achieves a higher utility higher than
the power auction. In Figure 3, we scale the system as in
Section 4 , and choose P/(Bn0) = 20 dB so that the utility
is not concave in power . When M ≤ 14, the auctions do not
achievethesociallyoptimalsolution.ForlargeM,theutilities
for both auctions and the socially optimal solution converge
to a constant. For this example, the asymptotic behavior is
accurate for M ≥ 14.
Figures4and5showtheperformanceofthedistributedbid
updating algorithm. Figure 4 shows the users’ bids starting
from very small initial bids and monotonically converging
to the unique NE bids. Figure 5 shows the performance of
the updating algorithm as the system is scaled. The target
system usage efﬁciency η∗ is chosen to be 0.90, 0.95 and
0.98, respectively. We can see that the number of iterations
needed for convergence increases with M and approaches a
R1
R2 R3
T3 T
M
1
T2
Figure 6. A three-user network model.
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Figure 8. Convergence of transmit power in the three-user network.
constant when M is large (i.e., M>20). This shows that the
algorithm scales well with the system size. The ﬁgure also
shows that the number of iterations needed for convergence
increases with η∗, implying that fast convergence and high
system usage efﬁciency are generally conﬂicting objectives.
Next we show some numerical examples with non-
collocatedreceivers.Figures7and8showtheconvergenceof
users’ bids and transmit powers in an SINR auction using the414 HUANG, BERRY AND HONIG
distributed algorithm in Section 5 for the network shown in
Figure 6. The network has three users, with transmitters and
receivers locatedatgridpoints. Thelinkgains between nodes
are inversely proportional to the square of the distance. All
users have the same logarithmic utility with θi = 10. Propo-
sition 2 says that all users achieve the same SINR at the NE.
The ﬁnal bids and transmit powers depend on the distance
between the users’ transmitters and the measurement point.
Since user 3’s transmitter is furthest from the measurement
point, user 3 can obtain a relatively high transmit power with
a small bid. It is easy to see that if all users transmit with the
same power, user 2 receives the most interference, and user
1 receives the least. Figure 8 shows that after compensating
for the interference, user 2 transmits with the highest power,
and user 1 transmits with the lowest power.
7. Conclusions
We have considered spectrum sharing among a group of
spread spectrum users with a constraint on the total inter-
ference temperature at a particular measurement point. We
proposed two auction mechanisms, SINR-and power-based,
that allocate power using a simple proportional bidding rule.
When combined with logarithmic utilities, the SINR auction
leads to a weighted max-min fair SINR allocation. The fol-
lowing results were obtained for the special case in which
the receivers are co-located with the measurement point.
Namely, the power auction maximizes the total utility with
largeenoughbandwidth.Also,subjecttocertainassumptions
on the utility functions, the power auction generates more
revenue than the SINR auction, although the difference in
revenue collected by the two auctions vanishes as the number
of users increases. Both auction mechanisms achieve social
optimality (i.e., maximize utility per user) in the large sys-
tem limit where bandwidth and power are increased in ﬁxed
proportion. We also presented an iterative, distributed bid up-
dating algorithm, which for both auctions converges globally
to the NE.
In this work we have assumed that the users and channels
are static, and that the interference temperature is measured
at a single location. Relaxing these assumptions leads to di-
rections for future research. A related topic is how to assign
bandwidth and power in the context of the Commons spec-
trum usage model, where there is no spectrum manager to
preside over the resource allocation. In that situation, a pri-
mary goal is to avoid the “tragedy of commons”.
Appendix
A. Proof of Theorem 1
Case I (β>0): We ﬁrst specify the best response Bi(b−i)f o r
user i ∈{ 1,...,M} with surplus
Si(bi;b−i) = Ui(γi(bi;b−i)) − πsγi(bi;b−i). (18)
Deﬁne the normalized channel gain ˆ hji = hji/hj0 for all
j,i ≥ 1s ot h a t
γi(bi;b−i)
=
bi ˆ hiiPB
n0B
  M
j=1 bi + β
 
+ P
  
j =i bj ˆ hji + βh0i
 .
(19)
Notice that for any ﬁxed b−i,γ i(bi;b−i) ≤ P ˆ hii/n0 and
equality is achieved when bi →∞ .
Differentiating (18) with respect to bi yields
∂Si(bi;b−i)
∂bi
=
 
∂Ui(γi(bi;b−i))
∂γi(bi;b−i)
− πs
 
∂γi(bi;b−i)
∂bi
,
(20)
where
∂γi(bi;b−i)
∂bi
=
 
n0B
  
j =i bi + β
 
+ P
  
j =i bj ˆ hji + βh0i
  
ˆ hiiPB
 
n0B
  M
j=1 bi + β
 
+ P
  
j =i bj ˆ hji + βh0i
  2 > 0.
(21)
Since the term in brackets in (20) is strictly decreasing in
bi,S i(bi;b−i) is a strictly quasi-concave function of bi, and
there exists a unique best response for user i,Bi(b−i), that
satisﬁes
Bi(b−i) =∞ , if πs ≤ U 
i
 
P ˆ hii
n0
 
∂Ui(γi(Bi(b−i);b−i))
∂γi(Bi(b−i);b−i)
= πs, if U 
i
 
P ˆ hii
n0
 
<π s <U  
i(0)
Bi(b−i) = 0, if U 
i(0) ≤ πs
(22)
If πs > max1≤i≤M U 
i(
P ˆ hii
n0 ), then Bi(b−i) < ∞, and can be
shown to satisfy
Bi(b−i) =
 
j =i
kijbj + ki0β, (23)
where kij is deﬁned in (6), ki0 is deﬁned in (7) and gi(πs)i s
deﬁned in (8). Therefore, if the auction has a unique NE b
∗,
then it is the unique component-wise nonnegative solution to
 
I − K
 
b = k0β, (24)
where K = [kij]i,j∈{1,...M} with kii = 0 for all i, and k0 =
(k10,...,k M0). 11 Deﬁne ˜ ı = argmaxi∈{1,...,M} U 
i(
P ˆ hii
n0 ) and
π = U 
˜ ı(
P ˆ h˜ ı˜ ı
n0 ) (i.e.,g˜ ı(π) =
P ˆ h˜ ı˜ ı
n0 ). When πs >π,K is a non-
negative matrix (i.e., all entries are nonnegative) and k0 is
also nonnegative component-wise. Let ρK be the spectral
radius of matrix K.I fρK < 1, then limn→∞ Kn = 0, and
11We denote all vectors as row vectors. The need for transposition should be
clear from the context.AUCTION-BASED SPECTRUM SHARING 415
(I−K)−1 =
 ∞
n=0 Kn exists and is nonnegative. In that case,
there is a unique component-wise nonnegative solution to
(24) given by
b
∗ =
 
∞  
n=0
Kn
 
k0β, (25)
which represents the unique NE of the auction. On the other
hand, if ρK ≥ 1, then
 ∞
n=0 Kn =∞ , and the auction has no
NE.
To show the existence of πs
th, as deﬁned in the theorem,
we will consider the following two subcases: (I.1) Only user
˜ ı has a positive best response at price π, i.e., gl(π) = 0f o r
all l  = ˜ ı, and (I.2) There is at least one other user l  = ˜ ı who
has a positive best response at price π.
Subcase I.1 (gl(π) = 0 for all l  = ˜ ı): Here we must have
πs
th = π. This is because for any πs >π,Bl(b−l) = 0f o r
all l  = ˜ ı,and the unique NE b
∗ = (0,...,0,b ∗
˜ ı ,0,...,0)
where
b∗
˜ ı = k˜ ı0β ≥ 0. (26)
For all πs ≤ π, B˜ ı(b−˜ ı) =∞and there exists no NE.
Subcase I.2 (∃l  = ˜ ı such that gl(π) > 0): To prove this sub-
case we ﬁrst show the following two statements: (i) ρK
is continuous and nonincreasing in πs.( ii) There exists
πs
H π such that ρK(πs
H) < 1. Since ρK(π) ≥ 1, it then fol-
lows that there exists πs
th ∈ [π,πs
H) such that ρK(πs) ≥ 1
for any π ≤ πs ≤ πs
th, and ρK(πs) < 1 for any πs >π s
th.
Additionally, we show that in this subcase, πs
th >π, i.e.,
there exists πs
L >πsuch that ρK(πs
L) > 1.
To show (i), let x = (x1,...,x M) be a nonnegative
vector. From Corollary 8.3.3o f[25] and the fact that a
square matrix has the same eigenvalues as its transpose, we
have
ρK(πs) = max
x≥0
x =0
min
j∈{1,...,M}
xj  =0
1
xj
M  
i=1
kij(πs)xi, (27)
where the dependence of ρK and kij on πs are explicitly
shown. Let x∗(πs) be a vector that achieves ρK(πs) in [27].
Note that x∗(πs) must have more than one positive entry,
otherwiseρK(πs) = 0. Assumethat π <π s <   πs.From(6),
kij(πs)isnonnegative,continuousandnonincreasinginπs >
π. Hence,
1
xj
M  
i=1
kij(πs)xi ≥
1
xj
M  
i=1
kij(  πs)xi (28)
for any nonnegative x that has more than one positive entry
and xj  = 0. This implies that
max
x≥0
x =0
min
j∈{1,...,M}
xj  =0
1
xj
M  
i=1
kij(πs)xi
≥ max
x≥0
x =0
min
j∈{1,...,M}
xj  =0
1
xj
M  
i=1
kij(  πs)xi, (29)
i.e., ρK(πs) ≥ ρK(  πs). Since each eigenvalue of a square
matrix depends continuously upon its entries (see Appendix
D of [25] ), ρK(πs) is continuous and nonincreasing in πs for
πs >π.
To show (ii), we have from Theorem 8.1.22 of [25] ,
ρK(πs) ≤ max
j∈{1,...,M}
M  
i =j
kij(πs). (30)
Thus it is sufﬁcient to show that
max
i,j∈{1,...,M}
kij(πs
H) <
1
M − 1
. (31)
Using (6), a sufﬁcient condition for (31) is
πs
H
> max
i∈{1,...,M}
U 
i ×
 
PBmini∈{1,...,M} ˆ hii
MBn0 + (M − 1)P maxi,j∈{1,...,M} ˆ hji
 
> max
i∈{1,...,M}
U 
i
 
P ˆ hii
n0
 
= π. (32)
Toshowthereexistsπs
L >πsuchthatρK(πs
L) > 1,from(27)
it is sufﬁcient to show that there exists an x > 0 and δ>0
such that πs
L = π + δ and
M  
i=1
kij
 
πs
L
 xi
xj
> 1, ∀j ∈
 
1,...,M
 
. (33)
From (8) and the assumptions in Subcase I.2, both
1/g˜ ı(πs) and 1/gl(πs) are positive, continuous and strictly
increasing functions for πs ∈ [π,π + δ ) with δ  <
min(U 
l(0),U 
˜ ı(0))−π.Thenforanygivenδ˜ ı > 0andδl > 0,
there exists a δ  > 0 such that for any δ<δ  ,
0 <
1
g˜ ı(π + δ)
−
1
g˜ ı(π)
≤ δ˜ ı, (34)
0 <
1
gl(π + δ)
−
1
gl(π)
≤ δl. (35)
If we let δl = 1/gl(π) − n0/(P ˆ hll) > 0,δ ˜ ı = n2
0/
(4δlP 2ˆ h˜ ı˜ ı ˆ hll) > 0,x ˜ ı = 1 and xj =
 
no/P ˆ h˜ ı˜ ı
 
/δ˜ ı for all j  =
˜ ı,then
xj
x˜ ı
=
no/P ˆ h˜ ı˜ ı
δ˜ ı
<
(n0 + P
B ˆ hj˜ ı)/(P ˆ h˜ ı˜ ı)
1
g˜ ı(π+δ) − 1
g˜ ı(π)
= k˜ ıj(π + δ) = k˜ ıj(πs
L),∀j  = ˜ ı, (36)416 HUANG, BERRY AND HONIG
where we have used the fact that g˜ ı(π) = P ˆ h˜ ı˜ ı/n0 by deﬁni-
tion. Thus k˜ ıj(πs
L)x˜ ı/xj > 1 for any j  = ˜ ı.A l s o
xl
x˜ ı
=
4δl
n0/(P ˆ hll)
>
1/gl(π) − n0/(P ˆ hll) + δl
n0/(P ˆ hll)
>
1/gl(π + δπ) − n0/(P ˆ hll)
n0/(P ˆ hll) + ˆ h˜ ıl/(Bˆ hll)
=
1
kl˜ ı
 
πs
L
 , (37)
i.e., kl˜ ı(πs
L)xl/x˜ ı > 1. Combining (36) and (37) give (33),
hence ρK(πs
L) = ρK(π + δπ) < 1.
Case II (β = 0): First, we observe that b
∗ = 0 is an NE if
and only if
Ui(0) ≥ Ui
 
P ˆ hii
n0
 
− πs P ˆ hii
n0
,∀i. (38)
That is, if all other users bid zero, then user i’s best response
bidisalsozerosinceapositivebidgivesthechangeinsurplus
 Si(bi;b−i) = Ui(
P ˆ hii
n0 )−πs P ˆ hii
n0 −Ui(0) ≤ 0. Furthermore,
if there is a unique NE, then b
∗ = 0. This is because if there
exists a nonzero ˜ b
∗
, which is a NE, then for any scalar υ>0,
υ˜ b∗ gives the same surplus values, hence is also a NE. Thus
there are an inﬁnite number of Nash Equilibria. Finally, there
is no NE when πs is too small (e.g., πs ≤ U 
i(
P ˆ hii
n0 )f o rs o m e
user i).
B. Proof of Theorem 2
Given an ε ∈
 
0,1
 
, it is straightforward to write out the
Kuhn-Tucker (KT) conditions for the total utility maximiza-
tion problem of the ε-system with co-located receivers:
maximize
prε≥0
M  
i=1
Ui
 
γi
 
prε
i
  
(39)
subject to γi
 
prε
i
 
=
prε
i
n0 +
 
P − prε
i
 
/B
M  
i=1
prε
i ≤ P(1 − ε).
Sinceproblem(39)isastrictlyconvexmaximizationprob-
lem under Assumption, the KT conditions are necessary and
sufﬁcient for the unique ε-social optimal solution.
Inthepowerauction,useri’ssurplusfunctionSi(bi;b−i) =
Ui(γi(pr
i(bi;b−i)))−πppr
i(bi;b−i)isastrictlyquasi-concave
function in bi. Hence there exists a unique value of bi that
maximizes Si(bi;b−i) for ﬁxed b−i. By setting πp equal to
the Lagrange multiplier in the KT conditions for problem
(39) the set of best responses for the users is the solution to
the KT conditions. Thus the power proﬁle at the NE achieves
ε-social optimality for any ε ∈ (0,1).
C. Proof of Proposition 4
With logarithmic utilities and co-located receivers, the ﬁrst-
order conditions for surplus maximization for user i gives
πp = U 
i
 
θi,γ i
 
pr∗
i
  
γ  
i
 
pr∗
i
 
=
θi
 
n0B + P
 
pr∗
i
 
n0B + P − pr∗
i
 .
(40)
Thus,
Rp =
M  
i=1
πppr∗
i =
M  
i=1
θi(n0B + P)
(n0B + P − pr∗
i )
>
M  
i=1
θi = Rs,
(41)
where the last equality is shown in the proof of Proposition
2. If θi ≤ ¯ θ for each i, then as M ←∞ , pr∗
i ← 0 for each
user i, and Rp/Rs ← 1.
D. Proof of Proposition 5
Weobtain(13)bytakingthelimitoftheconditionsinProposi-
tion1undertheassumedscaling.LetLimdenotelimP,B,M→∞
with P/B,P/M,β/Mﬁxed. Thus,
Lim
M  
i=1
ki
1 + ki
= Lim
M  
i=1
θi(P/B+ n0)
P(πs + θi/B)
=
1
M
Lim
M  
i=1
Mθi(P/B+ n0)
Pπs
=
P/B+ n0
P/Mπs E[θ]
(42)
with probability 1. The ﬁrst equality follows from the deﬁni-
tion of ki in (9), the second follows from the limit B →∞ ,
and the third follows from the strong law of large numbers.
Condition (13) then follows directly. The weighted max-min
fair SINR allocation and payments stay ﬁxed during the lim-
iting process. Since every user sees the same noise plus inter-
ference at the NE, n0 + P/B,w eh a v epr∗
i = γ ∗
i (n0 + P/B)
for all i. This corresponds to a weighted max-min fair power
allocation.
E. Proof of Theorem 4 (Sketch)
In the limiting system, the maximum average utility per user
is the solution to:
maximize
pr(θ)≥0
Eθ
 
U
 
θ,
pr(θ)
n0 + (P − pr(θ))/B
  
subject to Eθ[pr(θ)] =
P
M
(1 − ε)
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The objective is the average utility per user, and the con-
straint corresponds to the total received power constraint in
the ε-system. In both cases we have used the law of large
numbers to express these in terms of expectations over θ.
The optimization is over all received power allocations,
pr :[ θ,θ] → R+. We ﬁrst prove the following lemma:
Lemma 2. There exists a power allocation pr(θ) that
solves (43), which is ﬁnite everywhere, i.e.,
lim
P←∞
pr(θ)
P
= 0, ∀θ ∈ [θ,θ]. (44)
This lemma implies that each user receives a negligible
fraction of the total power as the system scales. The lemma
can be proved by contradiction. If the lemma were not true,
then at least one user would be allocated inﬁnite power as the
systemscales.Becausetheutilityissublinear,thisuserwould
contribute a negligible amount to the average utility. Thus
we could reallocate the user’s power among the remaining
users and strictly increase the average utility. This gives a
contradiction, proving the lemma.
Lemma 2 ensures that at a solution to (43), each user
receives the same interference plus noise n0 + P/B.T h i s
makes (43) a strictly concave maximization problem. By us-
ing calculus of variations [26], we can solve for p(θ)i n
closed form, as well as for the corresponding positive La-
grange multiplier λ for the average power constraint. Letting
πp = λ or πs = (n0 + P/B)λ results in the same power
allocation at the NE for the power and SINR auctions,
respectively.
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